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INCONSISTENCY AND HYPOCRISY 2 
Abstract 
It is not always possible for leaders, teams, and organizations to practice what they preach. 
Misalignment between words and deeds can invite harsh interpersonal consequences, such as 
distrust and moral condemnation, which have negative knock-on effects throughout 
organizations. Yet the interpersonal consequences of such misalignment are not always severe, 
and are sometimes even positive. This paper presents a new model of when and why audiences 
respond negatively to those who “say one thing but do another.” We propose that audiences react 
negatively if they (a) perceive a high degree of misalignment (i.e., perceive low “behavioral 
integrity”), and (b) interpret such misalignment as a claim to an undeserved moral benefit (i.e., 
interpret it as hypocrisy). Our model integrates disparate research findings about factors that 
influence how audiences react to misalignment, and it clarifies conceptual confusion surrounding 
word-deed misalignment, behavioral integrity, and hypocrisy. We discuss how our model can 
inform unanswered questions, such as why people fail to practice what they preach despite the 
risk of negative consequences. Finally, we consider practical implications for leaders, proposing 
that anticipating and managing the consequences of misalignment will be more effective than 
trying to avoid it altogether.  
 
KEYWORDS: inconsistency, misalignment, behavioral integrity, hypocrisy, morality, ethics, 
social cognition 
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From Inconsistency to Hypocrisy: 
 
When Does “Saying One Thing But Doing Another” Invite Condemnation? 
In 2013, former Panera Bread CEO Ron Shaich spent a week living off $4.50 day – the 
average budget for people living on food stamps – to raise awareness about the plight of low-
income families (Lutz, 2013; Shaich, 2013). A public champion of workers’ rights, Shaich has 
also spoken out against the unhealthiness of fast-food chains. Yet the decisions he has made as 
CEO have not always aligned with his words. In 2015, he replaced many Panera workers with 
computerized cashiers (Bryan, 2015), and his restaurants offer dishes like macaroni and cheese 
that contain more calories than a Big Mac ("Panera misses the mark on social activism," 2017). 
What consequences can Shaich expect his behavior to have for his reputation and his 
organization? How inconsistent and hypocritical will his employees, customers, and investors 
perceive his behavior as being? And what can he do to mitigate any negative fallout?  
 These questions are important because the kind of inconsistency that Shaich displayed is 
common in organizations (Culbert, 2008; Simons, 2002). A leader may claim to value diversity 
without actually enacting pro-diversity policies (see Thomas, 1990), managers may espouse the 
importance of work-life balance but stay late at the office themselves (Paustian-Underdahl & 
Halbesleben, 2014), or an employee may endorse safety regulations despite violating them 
(Leroy et al., 2012). In fact, such misalignments between words and deeds may be an inevitable 
part of organizational life. Managers may have conflicting commitments to multiple 
stakeholders, face trade-offs between values they have espoused, encounter bureaucratic 
obstacles to implementing stated ideals, or seek to inspire ethical behavior despite their own past 
transgressions (Brunsson, 1989; Effron & Miller, 2015; Simons, 1999, 2002). Employees may 
feel pressure to give lip service to ideals they do not uphold outside of work, or struggle to 
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balance multiple work identities across contexts (Caza, Moss, & Vough, in press). Inside and 
outside the workplace, people promise to meet deadlines that are too optimistic, forget verbal 
commitments, and experience lapses of willpower that lead them to violate their stated values 
(Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994; Graham, Meindl, Koleva, Iyer, & Johnson, 2015; Mead, 
Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Simons, 2008).  
 The present paper examines when and why “saying one thing but doing another” invites 
negative interpersonal reactions. We begin with a brief review of research on how people react to 
others’ misaligned words and deeds, and why these reactions matter for individuals, teams, and 
organizations. Then we highlight that reactions to such misalignment are not always negative 
– and are sometimes even positive. To resolve the puzzle of when people do versus do not react 
negatively to misalignment, we introduce a new model that considers how people perceive and 
interpret misalignment between words and deeds. In doing so, we resolve conceptual confusion 
surrounding three constructs that the literature often conflates: word-deed misalignment, 
behavioral integrity, and hypocrisy. Along the way, we do a deep dive into “what counts” as 
hypocrisy in laypeople’s minds. Our new conceptualization of hypocrisy reconciles competing 
scholarly definitions and integrates diverse research findings. 
Next, we use the model to organize and synthesize research on the situational factors that 
moderate interpersonal reactions to misaligned words and deeds. Examining these factors sheds 
light on the psychological processes that shape how people perceive, interpret, and respond to 
misalignment. Finally, we discuss how our model can inform unanswered questions, such as why 
people fail to practice what they preach despite the risk of negative consequences, we suggest 
future research directions, and we consider practical implications for how leaders acting in good 
faith can avoid charges of hypocrisy. Rather than the conventional advice to practitioners to 
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simply minimize misalignment, we offer suggestions on managing the consequences of 
misalignment when it inevitably occurs.  
1. Interpersonal Consequences of Word-Deed Misalignment 
1.1. Negative Interpersonal Consequences 
 “Saying one thing but doing another” can have a variety of negative interpersonal 
consequences. The same transgression can spark harsher moral condemnation and punitive 
sentiment when it is inconsistent with values the transgressor has previously endorsed than when 
it is not (e.g., Effron, Jackman, Markus, Muramoto, & Muluk, 2018; Laurent, Clark, Walker, & 
Wiseman, 2013; Powell & Smith, 2012) – an inconsistency penalty in judgments of wrongdoing 
(Effron, Lucas, & O'Connor, 2015). Even minor inconsistencies between endorsed values and 
actions can damage job-seekers’ prospects (Effron et al., 2015). Leaders may have more 
difficulty repairing their reputation following a transgression that they previously preached 
against than one they did not (Bhatti, Hansen, & Olsen, 2013; Grover & Hasel, 2015). Advising 
employees to “do as I say, not as I’ve done” can undermine a manager’s legitimacy (Effron & 
Miller, 2015). Finally, a meta-analysis showed that employees feel dissatisfied with and struggle 
to trust managers they perceive as saying one thing but doing another (i.e., managers low in 
behavioral integrity; Simons, Leroy, Collewaert, & Masschelein, 2014). In short, enacting word-
deed misalignment can invite severe interpersonal reactions. 
 These interpersonal reactions, in turn, can harm the organizations in which they occur. 
When employees perceive a manager as constantly saying and doing different things, they 
express weaker commitment to the organization, are absent more frequently, turnover at higher 
rates, are less likely to go above and beyond their role requirements with citizenship behavior, 
become disenchanted with change initiatives, perform more poorly, and even commit deviance 
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(Cha & Edmondson, 2006; Davis & Rothstein, 2006; Dineen, Lewicki, & Tomlinson, 2006; 
Greenbaum, Mawritz, & Piccolo, 2015; Kannan-Narasimhan & Lawrence, 2012; Palanski & 
Yammarino, 2011; Peterson, 2004; Prottas, 2008; Simons et al., 2014; Vogelgesang, Leroy, & 
Avolio, 2013). A key reason is that employees’ distrust of a manager whose words and deeds are 
misaligned undermines their motivation to help the manager and contribute to the organization 
(Simons, 2002; Simons et al., 2014). In this way, a negative interpersonal reaction to managers 
who fail to practice what they preach – distrust – can spiral into a larger organizational problem. 
Reactions to a team or organization whose actions are misaligned with its espoused 
values often resemble reactions to individuals who fail to practice what they preach – perhaps 
because people treat work teams and organizations as “social actors” that have many of the same 
cognitive capacities as individuals (Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006; Gioia, 
1986; King, Felin, & Whetten, 2010; Rai & Diermeier, 2015; Tsang, 1997). Both internal and 
external stakeholders react negatively to misalignment. Regarding internal stakeholders, team 
failures to enact stated values can undermine members’ trust, which in turn reduces team 
performance (Palanski, Kahai, & Yammarino, 2011). Similarly, employees may reduce their 
productivity in response to a mismatch between an organization’s espoused values and actual 
behavior (Cording, Harrison, Hoskisson, & Jonsen, 2014). Regarding external stakeholders, 
firms who display such a mismatch risk damaging their reputation (Lyon & Montgomery, 2013; 
Wagner, Lutz, & Weitz, 2009). For example, among firms who committed a corporate 
governance violation (specifically, backdating stock options), those who previously implemented 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives related to corporate governance saw a larger 
drop in their stock price than those who previously had CSR initiatives unrelated to corporate 
governance (Janney & Gove, 2011). Stock performance can also suffer when a firm takes 
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strategic actions that are misaligned with a strategy it previously communicated (Mavis et al., in 
press). And consumers express dissatisfaction with companies who appear to commit to 
implementing CSR more than they actually implement it (Ioannou, Kassinis, & Papagiannakis, 
2018). Anticipating negative stakeholder reactions to inconsistency, organizations may 
strategically conceal positive information about themselves, such as an environmental 
certification, that is directly misaligned with negative corporate actions, such as those that cause 
environmental damage (Carlos & Lewis, 2017).  
Thus, audiences tend to have negative interpersonal reactions to misalignment between 
an actor’s words and deeds – whether the actor is an individual, a team, or an organization – and 
these reactions can cause damage at all organizational levels.  
1.2. Positive Interpersonal Consequences 
 However, word-deed misalignment does not always have negative interpersonal 
consequences. One reason is that saying one thing but doing another can be an effective 
impression-management strategy (Lönnqvist, Rilke, & Walkowitz, 2015). An employee might 
find that agreeing to follow a micro-manager’s instructions, and then not actually following 
them, is more politic than arguing with the manager about why the instructions will not work. 
More cynically, successful politicians are adept at satisfying a constituency with words despite 
actually acting against its best interests (Edelman, 1964). Similarly, organizations can appear to 
address the demands of external stakeholders with “talk” that does not translate into action 
(Brunsson, 1989; Pfeffer, 1981) or with policies that are formally adopted but never 
implemented (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017; Bromley & Powell, 2012; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1994). For example, an organization might quiet social critics by appointing a 
diversity officer without doing anything substantive to diversify its workforce. In one study, 
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shareholders rewarded companies that said they would adopt corporate governance reforms, 
regardless of whether the companies actually adopted them (Westphal & Zajac, 1998). An 
audience may react positively to empty words or symbolic gestures when it is unaware they are 
misaligned with actual behavior (Pfeffer, 1981).  
 Misalignment between words and deeds may have positive consequences, however, even 
when audiences are aware of the misalignment. For example, a history of promoting a value can 
protect organization members from moral condemnation after appearing to transgress the exact 
same value (Effron & Monin, 2010) – a moral licensing effect (Monin & Miller, 2001). 
Promoting a value or otherwise doing good can secure people’s moral status in their own and 
others’ eyes – providing “moral credentials” and thus allowing them to act in morally 
questionable ways without damaging their reputation (see Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 
2015; Effron, 2016; Effron & Conway, 2015; Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). 
 Another positive consequence is that failing to practice a value can sometimes make 
preaching it more effective. For example, overweight individuals prefer to receive health advice 
from doctors who rarely exercise than from doctors who exercise frequently (Howe & Monin, 
2017). One reason is that people who have not always lived up to their ideals may be seen as 
having insights into why those ideals are important and difficult to uphold (Effron & Miller, 
2015). Another reason is that people who do not always live up to their values may seem more 
relatable and less judgmental (Howe & Monin, 2017). Indeed, people who fail to stand up for an 
important value will tend to derogate an individual who has stood up, because they imagine that 
she looks down on them (Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008; O’Connor & Monin, 2016). 
 Finally, leaders can inspire employees by espousing a value, even if the leaders cannot 
yet enact it. Depicting an inspiring future that hasn’t materialized yet is the very essence of 
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visionary leadership (Bass, 1999; Burns, 1978). In one study, employee performance improved 
when leaders emphasized the value of diversity even though the organization was not 
particularly diverse – apparently because employees interpreted the value as an aspiration 
(Nishii, Leroy, & Simons, 2014).  
To summarize, previous work suggests that audiences often react to “saying one thing but 
doing another” with distrust and moral condemnation. These negative interpersonal reactions in 
turn have undesirable consequences for individuals, teams, and organizations. Yet audiences do 
not always react negatively to word-deed misalignment, and sometimes react positively. Our 
model, described next, seeks to explain when and why the negative reactions occur. 
2. Theoretical Model 
We propose that when an audience witnesses an actor saying one thing but doing another, 
the audience asks itself two sets of questions, whether implicitly or explicitly. First, are the 
words and deeds misaligned (and if so, how much)? – and second, why are the words and deeds 
misaligned? The first question is about the extent to which inconsistency is perceived and the 
second is about how it is interpreted. Whereas perception refers to the detection of a stimulus 
(Colman, 2015), interpretation refers to the meaning imputed to the stimulus once detected. The 
two questions naturally arise in order; if the audience concludes that the words and deeds are not 
actually misaligned, then they will not go on to explain why misalignment occurred. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, our model predicts that misalignment between an actor’s words 
and deeds is most likely to invite negative interpersonal reactions (e.g., distrust and moral 
condemnation) when (a) in response to the first question, an audience perceives a high degree of 
misalignment (i.e., a low degree of behavioral integrity – a term that is used in the literature and 
that we explain later), and (b) in answer to the second question, the audience interprets the 
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misalignment as hypocrisy. The negative interpersonal reactions, in turn, lead to the undesirable 
organizational consequences reviewed above (e.g., low motivation and poor performance; not 
shown in the figure). In other words, we posit that perceptions of inconsistency, followed by 
interpretations of these perceptions, mediate the effect of actual inconsistency on an audience’s 
negative reactions. In this way, our model draws on classic theories of social cognition in which 
the effect of a stimulus on behavior depends on whether and how the stimulus is perceived as 
well as the meaning ascribed to it (see Bodenhausen & Hugenberg, 2009). 
 
------------ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------
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Figure 1 
Theoretical Model: When Do Audiences React Negatively to Others’ Word-Deed Misalignment?   
 
Actor’s Behavior:  
Word-Deed 
Misalignment 
Audience’s Reaction:  
Negative  
(e.g., distrusts and morally 
condemns actor) 
Audience’s 
Perception: 
Low Behavioral 
Integrity 
Audience’s 
Interpretation: 
Hypocrisy 
Audience detects the 
misalignment 
Audience does not detect 
the misalignment 
Audience explains the 
misalignment as a claim to 
an unearned moral benefit 
Audience does not 
explain the 
misalignment as a 
claim to an 
unearned moral 
benefit 
Audience’s Reaction:  
Neutral or Positive 
Note. Rectangles denote observable behaviors; ovals denote audience’s subjective judgments. 
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If an actor says one thing and does another, but the audience does not perceive a high 
degree of misalignment, or the audience perceives it but does not interpret it as hypocrisy, then 
the audience will tend not to react negatively. Whether the audience reacts neutrally or positively 
will depend on additional mechanisms, reviewed above, that are only relevant to specific 
situations. For example, when an audience infers no hypocrisy: if the actor has transgressed, then 
misalignment should provide a moral license (Effron & Monin, 2010); if the actor is offering 
advice, then misalignment should make her seem more relatable, as in the earlier example of the 
obese individuals preferring advice from less physically-active doctors (Howe & Monin, 2017); 
if the actor is describing a vision for the future, then misalignment could inspire them to achieve 
the vision (Nishii et al., 2014). A thorough examination of these mechanisms and the specific 
situations in which they operate is beyond the scope of our review. Importantly, though, our 
model posits that when an audience interprets misalignment as hypocrisy, this interpretation will 
suppress any mechanism that would otherwise promote positive interpersonal reactions to 
misalignment. For example, leaders who promote virtuous causes are typically given leeway to 
transgress, unless they are judged to be hypocritical. Thus, hypocrisy undermines moral license 
(Effron & Monin, 2010).  
Our model offers several contributions. Some previous theorizing, like ours, considers 
psychological mediators of word-deed misalignment’s effects (Cha & Edmondson, 2006; 
Wagner et al., 2009). For example, Simons (2002) distinguishes between actual and perceived 
misalignment. We go beyond this theorizing by distinguishing between two psychological 
mediators––not only how much misalignment people perceive, but also how they interpret 
(explain) any misalignment they perceive. Our model also considers the factors that shape these 
perceptions and interpretations. In doing so, we bring together empirical findings from 
 13 
previously disconnected literatures in organizational behavior (research on behavioral integrity; 
e.g., Simons, 2008) and social psychology (research on hypocrisy; e.g., Graham et al., 2015).  
Our model also clears away conceptual confusion among word-deed misalignment, low 
behavioral integrity, and hypocrisy – related terms that the literature often uses interchangeably 
(e.g., Greenbaum et al., 2015; Simons, Friedman, Liu, & McLean Parks, 2007). Disentangling 
these constructs, in our view, is critical to understanding when and why misalignment invites 
negative interpersonal reactions. In the next section we therefore define and discuss the 
distinctions between these constructs, with a particular focus on the thorny issue of what counts, 
to lay people, as hypocrisy (Alicke, Gordon, & Rose, 2013). A key issue we will address is 
where exactly morality features. Although some have argued that word-deed alignment and/or 
integrity are inherently moral (Becker, 1998; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995), our model 
suggests the question of morality only comes into play when people consider whether 
misalignment represents hypocrisy.  
3. Disentangling Key Constructs 
3.1. Word-Deed Misalignment  
Word-deed misalignment (“misalignment” for short) occurs when a person says and does 
different things (Simons, 2002). It is an objective description of behavior rather than a subjective 
perception. Misalignment itself is neither good nor bad, and the term conveys no information 
about a person’s motives or character. The relationship between words and deeds falls on a 
continuum of misalignment. For example, Ron Shaich’s decision to lay off cashiers and 
automate their job is at least somewhat misaligned with his espoused passion for workers’ rights. 
He would have displayed even more misalignment if he had laid off cashiers despite promising 
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never to do so. Our model aims to explain when an actor’s actual word-deed misalignment elicits 
negative reactions from observers. 
3.2. Behavioral Integrity  
Behavioral integrity (BI) refers to the degree of alignment people perceive between 
words and deeds (Simons, 1999, 2002, 2008). To view someone as low in BI simply means to 
perceive him or her as saying and doing different things. When someone enacts word-deed 
misalignment, not everyone will notice, recognize it as such, or agree on the magnitude of 
inconsistency. For example, some Panera customers who encounter automated cashiers may not 
know that Shaich has publicly championed workers’ rights; others may know, but never consider 
the inconsistency with replacing human cashiers; and still others may recognize some 
inconsistency between Shaich’s words deeds, but perceive its magnitude as small given that 
Shaich never explicitly denounced automation. 
BI was originally conceptualized as a trait that people ascribe to another person based on 
his or her chronic behavioral patterns. For example, a scale item asks employees whether their 
“manager conducts himself/herself by the same values he/she talks about” (Simons et al., 2007). 
More recent work argues that BI can also be a state ascribed to someone in a particular situation 
(Leroy & Mor, 2015, described in Moore, Lee, Kim, & Cable, 2017). For example, during a job 
interview, the interviewer could perceive that the candidate’s words and non-verbal displays do 
not match up without assuming that such misalignment would occur in other contexts. We use 
the term BI to refer to perceived word-deed alignment, regardless of whether it is a state or a 
trait.  
To begin disentangling BI from hypocrisy, it is important to note that perceiving someone 
as low in BI does not imply any particular interpretation of why his or her words and deeds are 
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inconsistent. Also, despite some colloquial and scholarly understandings of the term integrity as 
central to ethics (Becker, 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; see Palanski & Yammarino, 2007), 
behavioral integrity – like word-deed misalignment – is neither inherently moral or immoral 
(Simons, 2002). People judge the morality of acts based in part on the actor’s intentions, 
motives, and any extenuating circumstances (Ames & Fiske, 2015; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995), 
but the BI construct is agnostic about these variables. BI refers simply to the perception of 
(mis)alignment without explaining why the (mis)alignment occurred or whether it is morally 
problematic. 
3.3. Hypocrisy 
Hypocrisy is a morally discrediting interpretation of perceived word-deed misalignment, 
in our view. Whereas low behavioral integrity is a perception that words and deeds are 
misaligned, hypocrisy is an explanation of why they are misaligned. Thus, once word-deed 
misalignment is perceived, it may or may not be interpreted as hypocrisy (see Figure 1). Here, 
we consider the nature of this interpretation; Section 5 reviews research-supported factors that 
encourage or discourage this interpretation. 
In our view, to interpret an actor’s word-deed misalignment as hypocrisy is to believe it 
occurred because the actor has claimed an undeserved moral benefit. Moral benefits are social 
and psychological rewards that must be earned through virtuous character and behavior. They 
include appearing virtuous, feeling virtuous, being trusted, and having the right to judge others’ 
morality or to influence their moral behavior. Hypocrites seek, and sometimes receive, these 
benefits without deserving them. For example, in the play Tartuffe, Or the Hypocrite by Molière, 
the title character pretends to be pious to con a rich man named Orgon. Despite actually being a 
criminal vagrant, Tartuffe tricks Orgon into respecting and trusting him, listening to his advice 
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on intimate family matters, and allowing him to pass judgment on loved ones. As a result, 
Tartuffe almost steals Orgon’s wealth and property. As this example demonstrates, moral 
benefits are intangible, but can lead to tangible benefits, like money. It is thus understandable 
that people are loathe to dole out these benefits to undeserving recipients. 
Ron Shaich provides a more contemporary example. A hypocrisy interpretation of his 
behavior is that he was trying to enjoy the benefits of appearing pro-worker and pro-health (e.g., 
public accolades, personal pride, improved business, the right to criticize his fast-food 
competitors) without paying the cost of actually enacting pro-worker and health policies (e.g., 
retaining cashiers despite its expense; removing caloric foods from the menu despite their 
popularity). In this view, his public positions on workers’ rights and health “are just surface-level 
activism” ("Panera misses the mark on social activism," 2017) and he deserves no moral benefits 
from them.  
However, not everyone may interpret Shaich’s behavior as hypocritical, even if they 
perceive a high degree of misalignment with his public image. For example, some may see his 
activism as a genuine desire to help workers despite being unable to afford so many cashiers. 
Unless he lays off some workers, perhaps he would have to lower everyone’s wage to an 
unacceptable level. Other interpretations of why words have not translated into deeds include 
obstacles beyond one’s control, a legitimate change of heart (e.g., a reformed fraudster who now 
warns people against committing fraud), or a weakness of will (e.g., a smoker who preaches 
against tobacco use but is too addicted to quit; see Alicke et al., 2013; Barden, Rucker, & Petty, 
2005; Effron & Miller, 2015; Monin & Merritt, 2012). In these interpretations, Shaich may not 
have displayed much behavioral integrity, but he is not a hypocrite, and thus deserves little 
condemnation. 
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Our conceptualization of hypocrisy as a claim to an undeserved moral benefit represents 
a novel perspective. Previous scholarship offers little consensus about “what counts” as 
hypocrisy, in part because most of this work has offered normative definitions of what should 
count rather than testing what actually counts in laypeople’s minds (but see Alicke et al., 2013; 
Hale & Pillow, 2015). These normative definitions fall into three main categories: the mere 
inconsistency perspective simply equates hypocrisy with failing to practice what you preach 
(Brunsson, 1989; Greenbaum et al., 2015; Simons, 2002; Simons et al., 2007; Stone & 
Fernandez, 2008); the moral double-standards perspective operationalizes hypocrisy as holding 
others to harsher moral standards than one holds oneself (Graham et al., 2015; Lammers, 2012; 
Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010; Polman & Ruttan, 2012; Rustichini & Villeval, 2014; 
Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007, 2008); and the insincerity perspective describes hypocrisy as the 
espousal of moral values that are more virtuous than one’s actual values, regardless of which 
values one enacts (Crisp & Cowton, 1994; Monin & Merritt, 2012).  
We agree that inconsistency, moral double standards, and insincerity can appear 
hypocritical to laypeople, but disagree that any one of these captures the core of hypocrisy in 
laypeople’s minds. Empirically, not all inconsistencies are interpreted as hypocritical (e.g., 
Effron & Miller, 2015), not all examples of ordinary hypocrisy generated by research 
participants involve moral double-standards (Hale & Pillow, 2015), and not all hypocrisy 
involves insincerity. For example, in one study, 75% of students thought it was hypocritical for a 
tattooed parent to forbid her daughter from getting a tattoo (Alicke et al., 2013), even though few 
would question the parent’s sincerity. We propose that inconsistency, double standards, and 
insincerity can be hypocritical because they often involve claiming moral benefits that one lacks 
the right to claim. Thus, failing to practice what you preach will seem hypocritical if it makes 
 18 
you appear more virtuous than you deserve; moral double standards usually seem hypocritical 
because they imply a person is claiming the benefit of feeling “holier than thou” despite not 
being so; and when a teenager calls his mother a hypocrite for inveighing against drugs despite 
smoking pot in her youth, he is not questioning her sincerity so much as her right to tell him what 
to do. 
Characterizing hypocrisy as an undeserved claim on moral benefits clarifies why people 
sometimes interpret word-deed misalignment as a moral transgression. Taking a benefit to which 
you are not entitled violates basic norms of equity (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978) and 
challenges people’s desire to believe that we get what we deserve and deserve what we get (see 
M. Ross & Miller, 2002). It also resembles free riding – seeking to enjoy a benefit without 
paying the cost – which people are highly motivated to detect and punish (see Cosmides, 1989; 
Cosmides & Tooby, 2013; Delton, Cosmides, Guemo, Robertson, & Tooby, 2012; Fehr & 
Gachter, 2002; Jordan, Sommers, Bloom, & Rand, 2017). Thus, when people interpret word-
deed misalignment as hypocrisy, they have multiple reasons for condemning it.   
4. When Do People Perceive Words and Deeds as Misaligned? 
 Having distinguished among key constructs, and done a deep dive into what counts as 
hypocrisy, we now turn to the first psychological process in our model: perceiving the 
misalignment (see Figure 1). Before people grapple with whether to interpret word-deed 
misalignment as hypocrisy, they must determine whether, and how much, the words and deeds 
are misaligned (i.e., whether an actor has displayed low BI). Sometimes, identifying 
misalignment is easy because words and deeds are blatantly inconsistent with each other, as in 
the case of the academic who plagiarized an anti-plagiarism paper (see Oransky, 2015). Perhaps 
more commonly, though, the degree of misalignment between words and deeds is ambiguous. 
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Consider former U.S. education secretary and drug czar William Bennett, public critic of gay 
marriage and abortion, and editor of The Book of Virtues: A Treasury of Great Moral Stories 
(discussed in Barden et al., 2005). Known as a “national scold,” Bennett tarnished his reputation 
by gambling away $1.4 million in two months. His detractors perceived clear word-deed 
misalignment. After all, he had preached virtue while practicing vice. His defenders, in contrast, 
perceived no misalignment. After all, he had never specifically inveighed against gambling (Lott, 
2006). What shapes perceptions of word-deed misalignment in ambiguous situations like these? 
In this section, we review several research-supported factors (see Table 1). 
 
------ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------ 
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Table 1. Factors Influencing Perceptions of Word-Deed Misalignment (Low Behavioral Integrity) 
 
 
Factor 
Audience Perceives  
Word-Deed Misalignment 
When … 
Example Citation 
Motivation Audience is motivated to 
condemn the actor 
Partisans perceived more inconsistency in political 
statements attributed to members of the opposing 
party (vs. their own party) 
Weston, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & 
Hamann (2006) 
Chronic vigilance Audience has reason to worry 
about unfair treatment 
Black (vs. White) employees were more likely to 
notice inconsistency between a manager’s words and 
deeds 
Simons, Friedman, Liu, & McLean 
Parks (2007) 
Culture Audience’s culture takes 
words more (vs. less) literally 
Americans (vs. Taiwanese and Indians) perceived a 
broken promise as signaling lower BI 
Friedman et al. (2018) 
The Words’ 
Benevolence 
Actor’s words espouse more 
(vs. less) benevolence 
Students perceived an advisor whose words and 
deeds were misaligned as lower in BI when the words 
espoused high (vs. low) benevolence  
Leroy, Simons, Masschelein, & 
Deprez (under review) 
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 4.1. Motivation 
One factor is motivation, which research has long documented can shape the perception 
of ambiguous stimuli (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013; Balcetis & Dunning, 
2006; Hastorf & Cantril, 1954). Bennett was already a politically polarizing figure before his 
gambling was revealed. His opponents were probably motivated to perceive a contradiction 
between his words and deeds, whereas his supporters were probably motivated to perceive no 
contradiction. Research shows that when partisans evaluate a politician’s apparently 
contradictory statements, they see less inconsistency when the politicians are from their own 
political party as opposed to the opposing party (Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 
2006).  
People rarely jump to motivated conclusions without evidence; instead, they process 
evidence in a biased manner in order to reach those conclusions (e.g., Alicke, 2000; Ames & 
Fiske, 2015; Effron, 2018; Kunda, 1990). What sort of biased processing could enable motivated 
perceptions of word-deed misalignment? One possibility is that people strategically construe a 
person’s words and deeds at the level of abstraction that allows them to perceive the degree of 
misalignment they want. The same action (e.g., hammering a nail) can be construed more 
concretely with a focus on the details (e.g., driving metal into wood) or more abstractly with a 
focus on its meaning (e.g., building a house; Trope & Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Wegner, 
1987). Bennett’s opponents apparently construed his work as drug czar and his gambling 
abstractly as, respectively, “preaching against virtue” and “practicing vice,” suggesting word-
deed misalignment. Conversely, his supporters may have construed these same behaviors more 
concretely as “fighting illegal drugs” and “indulging in a legal pastime,” suggesting no 
misalignment. More generally, construing preaching concretely narrows the scope of behaviors 
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that would contradict it, whereas construing preaching abstractly widens the scope (cf. Eyal & 
Liberman, 2012; Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008). The construal level they spontaneously adopt 
may depend on how much misalignment they prefer to perceive. 
4.2. Chronic Vigilance 
People may also be more likely to perceive low behavioral integrity when they are 
habitually on the lookout for it (Simons, 2002). In a cross-sectional survey of 1,944 employees of 
107 different hotels, the same managers were perceived as lower in BI by Black American 
employees than by White American employees (Simons et al., 2007). These differences in BI 
then went on to explain racial differences in perceptions of interpersonal justice and trust in 
management. The authors suggested that the Black employees were more likely than the White 
employees to notice actual word-deed misalignment, rather than that managers displayed more 
misalignment toward Black employees. One explanation for these racial differences, favored by 
the study’s authors, is that historical and contemporary experiences as targets of prejudice give 
people good reason for vigilance against powerful individuals who do not stay true to their word.  
This explanation suggests other individual differences that should increase the perception 
of word-deed misalignment. For example, some individuals are chronically vigilant against being 
duped (Vohs, Baumeister, & Chin, 2007). Given that saying one thing but doing another is one 
way to dupe someone, these individuals may be particularly likely to perceive others’ behavior 
as low in behavioral integrity. Experiences with people who rarely practice what they preach 
could foster a similar degree of vigilance. For example, employees may more readily perceive a 
new manager as displaying low behavioral integrity if their previous manager displayed low 
behavioral integrity as well (Simons, 2002). 
4.3. Culture 
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Recent research suggests that people perceive the same act of word-deed misalignment 
differently in different national cultures. In one study, participants read about an employee 
whose manager publicly requests that he deliver data by a certain date. The employee first 
expresses reluctance, but then looks around at the others present and agrees to the request. Later, 
the employee either delivers the data (no misalignment) or does not (word-deed misalignment). 
American, Indian, and Taiwanese participants all perceived the employee as lower in trait BI 
when he displayed word-deed misalignment, but this effect was more pronounced for Americans 
(Friedman et al., 2018). One explanation is that a single act of word-deed misalignment seems 
less diagnostic of a trait or behavioral pattern in the East versus the West. Americans may be 
more confident than Indians and Taiwanese that a broken promise in one situation indicates a 
proclivity to break promises across situations (cf. Choi & Nisbett, 2000). Another explanation is 
that speech tends not to be taken as literally in Eastern than in Western cultural contexts 
(Triandis, 1994). In many Western cultures, people are expected to express meaning directly 
through their words. In many Eastern cultures, by contrast, meaning is expressed more indirectly 
and cannot be understood without attending to the manner and context in which words are 
uttered. Although the employee literally says he will deliver the data, his reluctance and his 
nonverbal behavior indirectly communicate that he will be unable to do so. American 
participants may have perceived more misalignment than Indian and Taiwanese participants 
because Americans were less attuned to this indirect communication. Regardless of the specific 
mechanism, culture seems to be an important moderator of whether word-deed misalignment is 
perceived as a lack of behavioral integrity. 
4.4. The Words’ Benevolence 
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The degree of misalignment people perceive between words and deeds may also depend 
on how benevolent the words are (Leroy, Simons, Masschelein, & Deprez, under review). 
Graduate students in a recent study imagined that their thesis advisor either claimed to have 
students’ best interests at heart (words: high benevolence) or claimed to prioritize her own 
interests over her students’ (words: low benevolence). Then they imagined that the advisor 
subsequently did or did not take action to help them (actions: high vs. low benevolence). When 
the advisor had espoused high benevolence, students rated her as higher in behavioral integrity 
when she acted versus did not act benevolently. However, when the advisor had espoused low 
benevolence, the benevolence of her actions had a weaker (and non-significant) effect on 
behavioral integrity ratings. A field study found analogous results among employees rating their 
managers. These findings suggest that people may be more vigilant against misalignments 
between deeds and benevolent (versus less-benevolent) words. Perhaps this is because failing to 
detect inconsistency between a supervisor’s espoused and enacted values has more serious 
consequences when the espoused values are benevolent. A student who mistakenly expected 
supportive advising occupies a more precarious position than one who planned for less support 
that the advisor ultimately provided. 
4.5. Summary 
The research and examples in this section illustrate that not all word-deed misalignments 
are perceived as such. We have focused on four empirically supported factors that shape such 
perceptions – motivation, chronic vigilance, culture, and the words’ benevolence. Behavioral 
integrity theory points to additional factors that remain to be tested. For example, Simons (2002; 
2008) speculated that followers are more likely to perceive leaders’ word-deed misalignment 
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than vice versa, and that violations of espoused values may be more noticeable to observers who 
care about the values than to those who do not. 
5. When Do People Interpret Misalignment as Hypocrisy? 
 We now turn to the second psychological process in our model: interpreting the 
misalignment (see Figure 1). Once an audience has perceived that an actor’s words and deeds are 
misaligned, what determines whether they interpret the misalignment as hypocritical? Research 
has documented several factors (see Table 2), which support our argument that people think of 
hypocrisy as claiming an undeserved moral benefit.  
 
------ 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------
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Table 2. Factors Influencing Whether People Interpret Misalignment as Hypocrisy 
 
Factor 
Audience Interprets 
Misalignment as Hypocrisy 
When… 
Example Citation 
Order of 
practicing and 
preaching 
Actors say one thing, then do 
another (vs. do one thing, then say 
another)  
When companies’ actions contradict their CSR policies, they 
seem more hypocritical when the policies preceded the actions 
(vs. when the actions preceded the policies). 
Wagner, Lutz, & Weitz (2009) 
Motivated 
reasoning 
Audience is motived to condemn 
the actor 
Political opponents (vs. supporters) are more likely to interpret 
a politician’s misalignment as hypocrisy. 
Barden, Rucker, Petty, & Rios 
(2014) 
Suffering for past 
misdeeds 
Actors have benefitted (vs. 
suffered) for the deeds they preach 
against 
A researcher who used to p-hack her data but now preaches 
against it would seem more hypocritical if she had benefitted 
from p-hacking than if she had paid a price. 
 
Effron & Miller (2015) 
Ambiguity of 
wrongdoing 
Wrongdoing is blatant (vs. 
ambiguous) 
When a manager made a blatantly racist personnel decision 
(vs. when he made an ambiguous decision that could seem 
racist), a history of promoting racial discrimination made him 
seem more hypocritical 
 
Effron & Monin (2010) 
Admission of 
misalignment 
Actors conceal (vs. reveal) their 
misalignment 
Employees who preach about the importance of honesty would 
be penalized for misalignment more harshly if they concealed 
(vs. revealed) that they inflate their expense reports 
Jordan, Sommers, Bloom, & 
Rand (2017) 
Moral vs. 
pragmatic 
commitment 
Actors change positions after taking 
a moral (vs. pragmatic) stand 
Political leaders who switch positions on an issue seem more 
like “hypocritical flip-floppers” when they had explained their 
initial position as related to fairness and equality (vs. 
economics) 
 
Kreps, Laurin, & Merritt 
(2017) 
Culture Audience’s culture fosters an 
independent (vs interdependent) 
model of the self 
Americans (vs. Japanese and Indonesians) condemned 
misalignment more harshly 
Effron, Jackman, Markus, 
Muramoto, & Muluk (2018) 
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5.1. Order of Practicing and Preaching 
Research suggests people interpret inconsistent practicing and preaching differently 
depending on the order of these behaviors. In one study, participants read about a student who 
fails to practice safe sex before versus after promoting its importance on campus radio. When the 
inconsistent practice followed the preaching, participants judged the student as more hypocritical 
than when the practice preceded the preaching. Mediation analyses suggested that this was 
because participants inferred that the student who “did one thing, but then said another” had 
“turned over a new leaf” and come to appreciate the importance of safe sex (Barden et al., 2005). 
Similarly, companies that violate CSR policies they already have in place are seen as more 
hypocritical than companies that implement CSR policies after taking an action that violates 
them (Wagner et al., 2009). These findings fit with our characterization of hypocrisy as an 
attempt to claim undeserved moral benefits. Preaching virtue is a benefit in that it places the 
preacher in a morally superior position to others, implying that he or she knows best and has the 
right to judge and influence them. A reformed sinner who has recognized the error of her ways, 
felt guilty, made amends, or exerted effort to change her behavior is more entitled to this benefit 
than a current sinner. 
5.2. Motivated Reasoning 
Just as motivation shapes observers’ perceptions of whether words and deeds are 
misaligned, it can also shape interpretations of whether such misalignment represents hypocrisy. 
Not only were Bill Bennet’s political opponents more likely than his supporters to perceive his 
gambling debts as misaligned with his virtuous public image, they were also more likely to 
condemn this misalignment as hypocrisy (Lott, 2006). Research has indeed shown that people 
are less likely to interpret their in-group (vs. outgroup’s) word-deed misalignment as hypocrisy, 
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but only when the deeds precede the words (Barden, Rucker, Petty, & Rios, 2014). That is, when 
a political leader “says one thing, then does another,” political ingroup and outgroup members 
alike infer hypocrisy. Apparently, a hypocrisy interpretation is so salient in such situations that 
people struggle to overlook it even when motivated to do so. However, when the leader “does 
one thing, then says another,” ingroup members can attribute the inconsistency to a positive 
change of heart, whereas outgroup members reject this attribution and infer hypocrisy.    
5.3. Suffering for Past Misdeeds 
 Although “failing to practice what you preached” seems more hypocritical than 
“preaching against what you used to practice,” the latter can still attract accusations of hypocrisy 
(Wagner et al., 2009). This highlights a challenge faced by people who have learned from their 
mistakes. How can they advise others to avoid these mistakes without seeming hypocritical? 
Consider a scientist who achieved a tenured faculty position, won numerous academic awards, 
and snagged a lucrative book deal by “p-hacking” her data – i.e., making strategic decisions 
about data collection and analysis that increase the likelihood of finding false but statistically 
significant results (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). Persuaded by recent arguments that 
p-hacking harms science, she wants to publicly condemn the practice. Is there anything she can 
do to minimize the risks of appearing hypocritical when she does? 
Research suggests that it would help to emphasize how her own p-hacking has created an 
unreplicable body of work, public embarrassment, and difficulty winning new grants. More 
generally, people are seen as more entitled to preach against what they used to practice if they 
have suffered for practicing it (Effron & Miller, 2015). Without demonstrably suffering for p-
hacking, the scientist appears to be having her cake and eating it too. It seems unfair for her to 
enjoy the moral benefits of condemning a questionable practice (e.g., the appearance of virtue, 
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the satisfaction of judging others) while simultaneously enjoying the professional rewards she 
acquired using the same practice. Paying a price for what she practiced diminishes this apparent 
unfairness and thus how hypocritical she seems. 
5.4. Ambiguity of Wrongdoing 
Earlier, we observed that promoting a value sometimes protects individuals from 
condemnation when they appear to transgress it (Effron & Monin, 2010). Our model suggests 
that audience ascriptions of hypocrisy will counteract this moral licensing effect when the 
audience thinks the individual is claiming an undeserved moral benefit. One factor that 
influences this interpretation in the context of moral licensing is the ambiguity of the alleged 
wrongdoing. 
Imagine a White executive who promotes five White employees but not two Black 
employees, privately explaining that he thinks Blacks are unsuitable for managerial positions. In 
light of this unambiguous racial discrimination, participants interpreted the executive’s behavior 
as more hypocritical when he had been a vocal proponent of racial equality, versus when he had 
not, or versus when he had been a proponent of gender equality. These hypocrisy ascriptions in 
turn predicted harsher moral condemnation (Effron & Monin, 2010). Presumably, participants 
interpreted his misalignment as an attempt to enjoy the benefits of appearing pro-diversity – 
benefits he did not deserve in light of his racism.  
However, people tend to react positively to word-deed misalignment when the deeds 
represent an ambiguous wrongdoing (Effron & Monin, 2010; see also Krumm & Corning, 2008; 
Polman, Pettit, & Wiesenfeld, 2013; Thai, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2016). Suppose the executive had 
justified his all-White promotion decision, not with racism, but by claiming that the two 
employees with the weakest performance simply happened to be Black. Now it is unclear 
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whether the promotion decision is legitimate or discriminatory – his true intentions are 
ambiguous. In this situation, participants were less condemning of the executive when he had a 
history of championing racial equality than when he did not – a moral licensing effect. Rather 
than making him appear hypocritical, the misalignment between his pro-diversity preaching and 
his promotion decision made this decision seem less racist. Suggesting that this effect is 
attributable to misalignment, a history of championing gender equality did not affect how 
participants construed his decision.  
These results suggest that word-deed misalignment seems hypocritical when the deeds 
represent blatant wrongdoing – but can get one off the hook for deeds that represent only 
ambiguous wrongdoing. The findings support our claim that word-deed misalignment does not in 
itself invite moral condemnation – only misalignment that is interpreted as hypocrisy.   
5.5. Admission of Misalignment 
Another factor determining whether word-deed misalignment seems hypocritical is 
whether the actor conceals versus reveals the misalignment. Consider an employee who tells a 
coworker that exaggerating reimbursable business expenses is unethical, but who secretly does it 
anyway. This employee seems like a canonical hypocrite who enjoys the benefits of preaching 
(appearing moral) while also enjoying the benefits of transgressing (i.e., getting more money). 
What would happen, though, if the employee openly admitted to cheating on his expense reports 
despite thinking it is unethical? The admission makes it clear that he is not attempting to benefit 
by feeling or appearing virtuous. Rather than feeling “holier than thou,” he may feel guilty about 
failing to follow his moral principles. Thus, he should seem less hypocritical. Recent research 
supports this intuition (Jordan et al., 2017). Those who condemn people for a behavior they 
readily admit to performing themselves are not penalized for their inconsistency. In our terms, 
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one cannot be accused of claiming unearned moral benefits – and thus does not seem like a 
hypocrite – if one has disclaimed the benefits.  
5.6. Moral vs. Pragmatic Commitments 
Leaders often have a choice about whether to justify their verbal commitments on moral 
grounds (e.g., “it’s the right thing to do”) versus pragmatic grounds (e.g., “it’s the rational thing 
to do;” Kreps & Monin, 2011). Recent research suggests that this choice has important 
consequences for how the public will react if the leader subsequently deviates from these 
commitments (Kreps, Laurin, & Merritt, 2017). For example, participants read about a political 
leader who initially said he opposed gay marriage because of a desire to respect tradition (a 
moral stance) or because a desire to avoid the costs of changing government systems (a 
pragmatic stance), but then later acted to support gay marriage. Participants interpreted this 
misalignment as significantly more hypocritical when the leader had initially taken a moral 
stance – even when participants themselves approved of his newfound support for gay marriage. 
Thus, infusing one’s words with morality can make subsequent misalignment seem like a 
“hypocritical flip-flop” rather than a “courageous evolution” (Kreps et al., 2017; but see Van 
Zant & Moore, 2015).  
These results fit with our view of hypocrisy as an unearned moral benefit. Leaders who 
deviate from a moral (vs. pragmatic) stance are more likely to seem like they have put on an 
undeserved mantle of virtue. The results also reinforce our claim that, unlike misalignment and 
BI, hypocrisy has a strong moral component. By changing positions on an issue, the leaders in 
these studies displayed word-deed misalignment – but when the leaders had moralized the issue, 
people interpreted this misalignment as hypocrisy.  
5.7. Culture 
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Earlier, we cited evidence that people in Western (vs. Eastern) cultural contexts are more 
likely to perceive an act of word-deed misalignment as low behavioral integrity (Friedman et al., 
2018). New research suggests that culture also moderates whether people interpret low 
behavioral integrity as hypocrisy (Effron et al., 2018).  
This research draws on the distinction between cultures that foster an independent versus 
interdependent model of self (e.g., Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Markus & Conner; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). In independently oriented cultures (e.g., many of 
those in North America and Western Europe), people tend to view the self as having a core 
essence comprising internal traits (Fiske et al., 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Riemer, 
Shavitt, Koo, & Markus, 2014; Triandis, 1995). As a result, virtue is located inside the person, 
and can be sussed out based on whether people enact virtue consistently across multiple 
situations, especially in private. A virtuous internal character earns the right to moral benefits 
such as being perceived as virtuous by others. To claim those benefits without truly being 
virtuous is hypocrisy. Thus, preaching virtue in public while practicing vice in private receives 
harsh moral condemnation in independently oriented cultures. 
 By contrast, in interdependently oriented cultures (e.g., many of those in Asia and Latin 
America), the self comprises relationships and roles and can therefore be expected to change 
across social contexts (Fiske et al., 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Riemer et al., 2014; 
Triandis, 1995). As a result, virtue is conferred by other people rather than being located solely 
inside the person, and it can be sussed out by observing how sensitive people’s public behavior is 
to the obligations of different roles and situations. From this cultural perspective, being 
perceived as virtuous by others is itself an important component of virtue, not a moral benefit 
reserved for people who are “truly” virtuous on the inside. In such cultures, preaching virtue in 
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public when the situation calls for it, despite privately practicing vice, may seem socially 
sensitive rather than a hypocritical claim to an undeserved moral benefit. Such misalignment 
may therefore receive less moral condemnation in cultures that are oriented towards 
interdependence (vs. independence). 
Several studies provided support for these ideas (Effron et al., 2018). In one, participants 
from an independently oriented culture (USA) and two interdependently oriented cultures (Japan 
and Indonesia) read about an employee who committed a minor misdeed (e.g., reckless driving). 
Participants in all three countries responded to the misdeed with harsher moral condemnation 
when the employee had previously preached against the same misdeed, compared to when he 
had preached against an unrelated misdeed or no misdeed. However, this effect was significantly 
larger in the more independently oriented culture than in the interdependently oriented cultures. 
In a follow-up study, MBA students from 46 nations rated their most recent manager’s 
behavioral integrity and trustworthiness. As in previous work, the higher they perceived the 
manager’s BI, the more they trusted him or her. Going beyond previous work, the more 
interdependently oriented their national culture was, the weaker this effect became. Whereas 
Friedman and colleagues (2018) show that the relationship between word-deed misalignment and 
BI is stronger in a more independent culture (the U.S.) than in more interdependent cultures 
(India and Taiwan), this study shows that relationship between BI and its downstream 
consequences is also stronger in more independent cultures. Presumably, this is because the same 
degree of perceived word-deed misalignment is interpreted as less hypocritical in interdependent 
(vs. independent) cultural contexts.  
5.8. Summary 
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The research described in this section reveals several factors that shape whether people 
infer hypocrisy from word-deed misalignment (see Table 2). Although this research was not 
designed to test our model, it supports the model’s key assumptions. First, it demonstrates that 
not all acts of misalignment are viewed as hypocritical (e.g., Effron & Miller, 2015; Effron & 
Monin, 2010; Jordan et al., 2017). Second, it supports the claim that hypocrisy adds a moral 
dimension to word-deed misalignment. Taking a moralized stand on an issue invites hypocrisy 
interpretations if one deviates from the stand (Kreps et al., 2017), and hypocrisy interpretations 
predict moral condemnation (e.g., Effron & Monin, 2010). Finally, the research is consistent 
with the idea that laypeople conceptualize hypocrisy as an attempt to claim undeserved moral 
benefits. In situations and cultures in which misalignment is less likely to signal that the benefits 
were obtained or unearned, the moral penalty for misalignment is lower (Barden et al., 2005; 
Effron et al., 2018; Effron & Miller, 2015; Effron & Monin, 2010; Jordan et al., 2017; Kreps et 
al., 2017). 
6. Summary of Theoretical Model 
 According to our model, an actor’s word-deed misalignment is more likely to provoke 
negative reactions from an audience when (a) the audience perceives the actor’s misalignment, 
and (b) the audience interprets it as hypocrisy (see Figure 1). We have now reviewed a number 
of factors that influence these perceptions and interpretations, and that should thus affect how 
negatively audiences react to word-deed misalignment. An important contribution of the model 
is to clarify the distinctions and relationships between word-deed misalignment (objective 
reality), behavioral integrity (subjective perception of misalignment), and hypocrisy 
(interpretation of misalignment). Another important contribution is our new conceptualization of 
hypocrisy as an unearned moral benefit. This conceptualization reconciles competing definitions 
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of hypocrisy offered by scholars, and explains a wide range of empirical findings about what 
counts as hypocrisy to laypeople. In the remainder of this paper, we highlight how our model can 
inform open questions and suggest future research directions, which we briefly illustrate with our 
recent and in-progress research.    
7. Open Questions and Future Directions 
7.1. Why Is Misalignment So Prevalent?  
Given that word-deed misalignment’s interpersonal consequences can be so negative, its 
apparent prevalence in organizations is striking. One explanation is that many people are actually 
motivated by hypocrisy: They want to reap the benefits of feeling or appearing moral without 
paying the requisite costs (Batson, 2002, 2016; Kurzban, 2010). Evidence for this explanation 
comes from laboratory experiments in which participants allocate resources selfishly despite 
simultaneously striving to appear generous or fair to both others and themselves (Batson, 
Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & 
Strongman, 1999; Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007; Lönnqvist, Irlenbusch, & Walkowitz, 2014; 
Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995). At the organizational level, a similar hypocrisy motive could lead a 
firm to use words to mislead the public about the nature of its deeds (cf. Edelman, 1977). For 
example, a company might disguise its poor environmental track record by touting a 
commitment to environmental friendliness – a practice known as “greenwashing” (Delmas & 
Burbano, 2011). 
A more charitable explanation for word-deed misalignment in organizations, suggested 
above, is that organizational factors beyond individuals’ control make perfect alignment difficult 
or impossible (see Simons, 2002). For example, bureaucratic obstacles may block the enactment 
of espoused values (Simons, 2002). Relatedly, ideas change faster than actions, so words that 
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reflect current thinking will be inconsistent with current practice (Brunsson, 1993). For example, 
new rhetoric in a change management initiative may be rolled out faster than the underlying 
processes can be adapted to fit it (Simons, 1999). Word-deed misalignment could also result 
from poor communication among different units of a firm. The marketing team that touts a 
company’s commitment to environmentalism, for example, may not be fully aware of the 
environmental harm caused by the company’s products (Delmas & Burbano, 2011). In all these 
cases, word-deed misalignment results from organization members acting in good faith rather 
than hypocritically. 
Another explanation is that organization members face competing demands that cannot 
be simultaneously satisfied. First, leaders must make tradeoffs between competing values. It is 
not always possible to both maximize profits and minimize environmental impact, for example. 
To resolve the psychological discomfort of such tradeoffs (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & 
Lerner, 2000), and to manage the potential reputational damage (Tetlock, Mellers, & Scoblic, 
2017), leaders may pay lip service to one value while acting in accordance with the other 
(Brunsson, 1989). Second, organization members need to manage competing demands from 
different stakeholders. For example, middle managers may struggle to reconcile a boss’s 
expectations of their team’s performance with the individual team members’ needs (Way, 
Simons, Leroy, & Tuleja, 2016). Leaders lack the time, attention, and resources to attend to all 
constituencies’ demands (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), and some demands may be mutually 
incompatible (Simons, 2002). Given that the right verbal gestures can satisfying stakeholders in 
the absence of tangible action (Pfeffer, 1981; Westphal & Zajac, 1998), it is perhaps 
understandable that leaders would display word-deed misaligning by giving “the rhetoric to one 
side and the decision to the other” (Edelman, 1964, p. 39; quoted in Pfeffer, 1981, p. 34). 
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Our model suggests another explanation for word-deed misalignment’s prevalence. The 
degree of misalignment between words and deeds, and whether any such misalignment counts as 
hypocrisy, has a large subjective component. Exploiting this subjectivity using motivated 
reasoning, actors can convince themselves that their words and deeds are neither particularly 
misaligned nor hypocritical. Because they are unaware of their motivated reasoning (Balcetis, 
2009), actors may erroneously assume that their behavior would be perceived and interpreted in 
the same way by observers (Effron, 2014; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; L. Ross 
& Ward, 1996). As a result, actors may mistakenly think an observer would find little reason to 
condemn their behavior for misalignment. Thus, people may be willing to “say one thing but do 
another” despite the risk of negative interpersonal consequences because they underestimate the 
risk. 
Preliminary evidence for this possibility comes from a lab study in which participants 
were assigned to be either actors or observers (Effron & Kakkar, in progress). Actors were asked 
to record a video in which they preached about the importance of either environmentalism or 
responsible time management (depending on randomly assigned condition). Then they wrote an 
essay about a time when they failed to live up to the same value they had preached 
(misalignment condition) or the other value (no-misalignment condition). Finally, they estimated 
how an observer would rate their moral character based on their video and their essay. Observers 
actually provided such ratings after examining the video and essay. As predicted, actors 
underestimated the extent to which misalignment between their words (video) and deeds (essay) 
would diminish their moral character in observers’ eyes. People may not anticipate the social 
costs of their word-deed misalignment, which could make them more willing to enact it.  
7.2. Beyond Interpersonal Reactions: What are Misalignment’s Other Consequences? 
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Our theorizing has focused on explaining when and why misalignment elicits negative 
interpersonal reactions (e.g., distrust and moral condemnation) because these reactions predict 
lower employee motivation (e.g., poorer commitment, engagement, and satisfaction) and 
undesirable organizational behaviors (e.g., poorer performance, less moral behavior; see Cha & 
Edmondson, 2006; Simons et al., 2014). Interpersonal reactions are also germane to 
understanding the consequences of misalignment enacted by teams and organizations, because 
people treat these collectives like individuals (e.g., Palanski et al., 2011). In this way, 
interpersonal reactions to misalignment have important organizational consequences.  
However, not all of misalignment’s organizational consequences stem from interpersonal 
reactions. Imagine a manager who espouses many values but only rarely puts them into practice. 
His employees perceive this misalignment, but interpret it as a sign that he is indecisive or 
ineffective, not that he is a hypocrite. Although they may not react with distrust or moral 
condemnation, their performance may still suffer because they are confused about what the 
manager expects from them (Simons, 2008). A meta-analysis supports the idea that negative 
interpersonal reactions only partially explain BI’s organizational consequences (Simons et al., 
2014). The results showed that the relationship between managers’ BI and employees’ 
performance was partially mediated by employees’ trust in the manager; there was also a 
significant direct effect of BI on performance that did not pass through trust. Future research 
should test whether employee confusion explains this direct effect. More broadly, future work 
should go beyond our model by considering organizational consequences of misalignment that 
occur even when the misalignment is neither attributed to hypocrisy not met with negative 
interpersonal reactions.  
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7.3. Can Negative Interpersonal Reactions to Misalignment Have Positive Organizational 
Consequences?   
We have focused on how negative interpersonal reactions to word-deed misalignment can 
harm organizations. However, these reactions may also have peripheral consequences that 
benefit organizations. Specifically, people’s aversion to hypocrisy can motivate positive behavior 
change (Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991; Fointiat, Grosbras, Michel, & Somat, 2001; Stone, 
Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994). For example, if employees observed a colleague 
preach the importance of diversity but then share a racist meme on Facebook, they might bolster 
their own commitment to diversity to counteract the colleague’s apparent hypocrisy. More 
generally, witnessing an ingroup member espouse, and then violate, a value can motivate 
individuals to protect or bolster the integrity of their group’s identity by increasing support for 
the relevant ingroup value (Cooper & Hogg, 2007; Cooper & Trujillo, 2014; Focella, Stone, 
Fernandez, Cooper, & Hogg, 2016; Norton, Monin, Cooper, & Hogg, 2003). Investigating 
whether this vicarious hypocrisy effect occurs in organizational contexts, and whether its benefits 
outweigh the organizational costs of potentially hypocritical behavior, is an interesting task for 
future research. 
7.4. Beyond the Prototypical Hypocrite: What Else Counts as Hypocrisy?  
 By conceptualizing hypocrisy as a claim to an unearned moral benefit, we offer a more 
complete account of hypocrisy than prior scholarship. In some ways, our conceptualization 
narrows the field’s perspective on hypocrisy. Contrary to some scholarly perspectives (e.g., 
Simons, 2002; Stone & Fernandez, 2008), we have argued that word-deed misalignment and a 
lack of behavioral integrity do not by themselves constitute hypocrisy (see Figure 1). In other 
ways, our conceptualization broadens the field’s perspective. The prototypical hypocrite fails to 
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privately practice the virtues he or she public preaches – like Tartuffe, who appears pious to 
others but secretly commits crimes. By contrast, a person can lay claim to an undeserved moral 
benefit even if he or she does not fit this prototype. Research should thus be able to identify 
behaviors that reliably receive condemnation for hypocrisy and yet do not involve inconsistency 
between public virtues and private vices. 
Our recent work provides examples of such behaviors. In one series of studies, we find 
that people receive condemnation for hypocrisy when their public appearance is less virtuous 
than their private actions. One such “reverse Tartuffe” would be a tobacco executive who 
publicly promotes smoking but secretly donates to anti-tobacco causes. Indeed, participants 
found this inconsistent individual significantly more hypocritical than a tobacco executive who 
secretly donates to anti-obesity causes. Mediational evidence suggested that this was because 
participants interpreted the inconsistent executive’s donations as motivated by a desire to assuage 
his guilt (O’Connor, Effron, & Lucas, under review). In other words, participants only perceived 
volunteering as hypocritical when they interpreted it as an attempt to feel virtuous (less guilty 
about pedaling carcinogens) without giving up a less-than-virtuous behavior (i.e., without 
quitting the tobacco job). Thus, consistent with our characterization of hypocrisy as claiming an 
unearned moral benefit, word-deed misalignment can seem hypocritical even if it does not 
involve “appearing more virtuous than you are;” “feeling more virtuous than you deserve” 
suffices. 
 In other work, we find that audiences will ascribe hypocrisy even to actors whose words 
and deeds are not misaligned. For example, people find it hypocritical for workers to act 
inconsistently with an organization’s values, even if the workers themselves have never preached 
or explicitly endorsed those values (Effron et al., 2015). Undergraduates in a lab study evaluated 
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applications for a research assistant job. One candidate had been cited by campus police for a 
misdeed: either texting while driving or buying alcohol with a fake ID. This candidate had also 
interned at a marketing firm two years previously, where his manager assigned him to enter data 
for a cause that opposed either the same misdeed or a different misdeed. When the misdeed 
violated the cause, participants thought he was less moral, less competent, less deserving of the 
job, and merited a lower hourly pay rate than when it violated a different cause. Thus, he was 
penalized for his association with a cause he transgressed, even though his association was 
tenuous, short-term, in the past, and assigned by his manager. It was the misalignment between 
his image and his behavior, rather than between his words and deeds, that seems to have made 
him a hypocrite in participants’ eyes. In light of his misdeed, his image represented an unearned 
moral benefit. 
A related example of how hypocrisy can be perceived in the absence of word-deed 
misalignment occurs in large corporations or governments that endure across multiple 
generations of leaders. Consider a CEO who, in 2008, requested debt relief for his organization 
from the government. Participants found him more hypocritical and rated his request as less 
legitimate when a previous CEO of the same company had petitioned against debt relief for other 
organizations in 1965 (Lucas, O’Connor, & Effron, in preparation). Although the 2008 CEO’s 
deeds were not misaligned with his own words, they were misaligned with the words of his 
predecessor. More generally, practicing what a predecessor preached against can sometimes 
seem hypocritical. Whereas	mere	inconsistency	between	a	current	and	previous	leaders’	
words	and	deeds	are	insufficient	to	evoke	hypocrisy	–	organizations	often	hire	a	new	
leader	precisely	because	they	want	to	break	with	previous	leaderships’	policies	–	
participants	presumably	perceived	hypocrisy	in	this	case	because	they	saw	the	CEOs	as	
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claiming	mutually	incompatible	moral	benefits	on	behalf	of	their	organization:	the	right	to	
preach	against	helping	distressed	organizations,	and	the	right	to	receive	help.	A	leader	who	
claims	the	first	benefit	deprives	successors	of	the	second.   
Although many individuals labelled as hypocrites fit the prototype of someone who 
appears more virtuous than he or she acts in private, these recent studies support a broader view 
of how lay people think about hypocrisy – one that fits with our conceptualization of hypocrisy 
as a claim to an unearned moral benefit. We hope future research will continue to build on this 
expanded view of hypocrisy.   
7.5. What Role Does Authenticity Play?  
An important future direction will be to examine how authenticity relates theoretically 
and empirically to word-deed misalignment, behavioral integrity, and hypocrisy. We omitted 
authenticity from our model because the relevant literature suffers from a range of competing 
conceptualizations. For example, one analysis defines organizational authenticity as 
“consistency between a firm’s espoused values and its realized practices” (Cording et al., 2014, 
p. 39), which is tantamount to word-deed alignment at the organizational level. By contrast, other 
scholarship has examined authentic personality (Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 
2008), authentic functioning (Kernis, 2003) and authentic leadership (Avolio & Gardner, 2005) 
– multidimensional constructs that do not map clearly onto word-deed alignment. Disentangling 
these different views of authenticity is beyond the scope of our analysis.  
Nonetheless, we can offer some preliminary thoughts about how one view of authenticity 
relates to our model’s core constructs. In our view, authenticity is most usefully conceptualized 
as the degree of congruence between one’s outward or visible behavior and one’s true or real 
intentions, emotions, values, or beliefs (Caza et al., in press). Thus, inauthenticity involves 
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inconsistency, but between appearance and reality rather than between words and deeds. Low BI 
could be a cue to inauthenticity. For example, claiming to value collegiality would seem 
inauthentic coming from someone who always undermines coworkers. However, low BI is not a 
necessary condition for inauthenticity. A customer service representative’s words (“I’m happy to 
help”) may align perfectly with his deeds (effectively helping the customer), but he may 
nonetheless feel or appear inauthentic if he actually despises his job (Ashforth & Humphrey, 
1993; Grandey, 2003).  
Hypocrisy and this view of inauthenticity are both related to false appearances. As we 
have argued, one way of claiming undeserved moral benefits – and thus being seen as 
hypocritical – is to appear more virtuous than you really are. And inauthenticity occurs when 
public appearances do not reflect the true self. However, unlike authenticity, hypocrisy does not 
require false appearances. For example, consider American Congressional leaders accused of 
hypocrisy for supporting stricter immigration controls, even though more open policies allowed 
their own ancestors to immigrate to America (Hesse, 2018). Their ancestry does not cast doubt 
on whether they truly support the policies they are endorsing. Their alleged hypocrisy is not 
about a lack of authenticity, but about taking a moral stand against a policy that personally 
(though indirectly) benefitted them. As this example illustrates, hypocrisy and inauthenticity are 
related but distinct. 
With these potential distinctions in mind, new research could test the relationships among 
authenticity, hypocrisy, BI, and word-deed misalignment. It would be particularly interesting to 
examine the perspective of both actors and observers. When do audiences infer inauthenticity 
from word-deed misalignment, and do these inferences have different antecedents and 
consequences than hypocrisy ascriptions? When does enacting word-deed misalignment lead 
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actors to feel inauthentic, and are the antecedents and consequences of this feeling different than 
feeling hypocritical? Addressing questions like these would deepen our understanding of both 
hypocrisy and authenticity, clarifying conceptual confusion in the literatures on each construct. 
8. Practical Implications 
 “Walk your talk,” leaders are advised (e.g., Kouzes & Posner, 2011; Simons, 2008); in 
other words, minimize misalignment. However, given that some misalignment is inevitable in 
managing the complexities of organizations – and can even be strategic and beneficial – this is 
easier said than done. An alternative is to avoid words and let deeds speak for themselves. 
However, given the power of words to inspire followers (Bass, 1999; Burns, 1978), we do not 
recommend that leaders avoid espousing values.  
We suggest that “manage misalignment” is better advice than “minimize misalignment.”  
That is, practitioners should focus not only on how misalignment can be avoided, but also on 
how to reduce its fallout when it inevitably occurs. Determining the wisdom of deviating from a 
value one has espoused requires predicting the severity of the consequences. Our model suggests 
that the drawbacks of word-deed misalignment depend on two touchpoints: (a) whether 
observers perceive the inconsistency and (b) whether observers interpret it as hypocrisy. Our 
model also highlights factors that affect these perceptions and interpretations, which leaders can 
use to make informed decisions about how much to prioritize alignment relative to other 
considerations. For example, particularly in cultures where misalignment is less likely to be 
perceived as low BI or interpreted as hypocrisy (Effron et al., 2018; Friedman et al., 2018), the 
social benefits of tuning one’s words and deeds to fit the demands of different social situations 
will sometimes exceed the social costs of inconsistency. 
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 People hoping to minimize the fallout from word-deed misalignment might also consider 
suggesting non-hypocrisy interpretations of this misalignment before a hypocrisy interpretation 
has taken hold. For example, accompanying public commitments with an honest assessment of 
why they may be difficult to implement should make any word-deed misalignment seem less 
hypocritical by clarifying that the commitment is not a claim to be “holier than thou” (Jordan, et 
al., 2017). Ron Shaich might have avoided accusations of hypocrisy if he had accompanied his 
public support for workers’ rights with a disclaimer that wage cuts and layoffs are sometimes 
inevitable.    
 Another reason to prefer “managing misalignment” to an “avoiding misalignment” is that 
a world where people avoid preaching against anything they sometimes fail to practice is not 
necessarily a more just and moral world. If a spotless moral record were required to stand up for 
what’s right, then most of us would remain seated. Even if we cannot always act in perfect 
accordance with the values we care about, we should have the courage to speak up about them –– 
and the wisdom to anticipate and manage the fallout. 
9. Conclusion 
When individuals, teams, or organizations fail to practice what they preach, they are often 
penalized with negative interpersonal reactions, such as distrust and moral condemnation, which 
can snowball into organizational problems like poor performance, employee turnover, and 
deviant behavior. Yet audiences who witness word-deed misalignment do not always react 
negatively, and sometimes even react positively. Given the virtual impossibility of keeping one’s 
words and deeds perfectly aligned – particularly as an organizational leader – it is crucial to 
understand when and why misalignment invites negative reactions. Our model suggests that such 
reactions occur if the misalignment is both perceived as such (low BI) and interpreted as an 
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unearned moral benefit (hypocrisy), and we have reviewed a number of factors that influence 
these perceptions and interpretations.  
Our model offers guidance to researchers interested in misalignment. We suggest 
distinguishing between the oft-conflated constructs of word-deed misalignment, behavioral 
integrity, and hypocrisy. In this vein, we also recommend that studies measure not only whether 
audiences perceive an actor’s misalignment, but also how they interpret it (e.g., why they think it 
occurred; how hypocritical they think it is). In our view, past research has been constrained by 
what scholars think should count as hypocrisy; future research should consider what laypeople 
actually think counts as hypocrisy. Lay people conceive of hypocrisy more broadly than the act 
of publicly preaching virtue while privately practicing vice; in this way, hypocrisy has more 
faces than prior work has captured. 
In contemporary society, hypocrisy is “the only unforgivable sin,” according to political 
theorist Judith Shklar (1984, p. 45). We hope to have shed new light on when and why people 
are condemned for this sin and – perhaps most importantly – how they can manage the risk of 
such condemnation even if they cannot always practice what they preach. 
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